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MANNING V. MINING AND MINERALS DIVISION:
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AS A BAR AGAINST CLAIMS
FOR DAMAGES BROUGHT UNDER THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION
NAT CHAKERES*

I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has strengthened and
expanded the doctrine of state sovereign immunity.' In particular, the Court held in
Alden v. Maine2 that the Constitution protects States from suits for damages brought
by private parties in state courts and that Congress cannot abrogate that immunity
pursuant to its power to regulate interstate commerce. 3 In Manning v. Mining &
Minerals Division,4 the New Mexico Supreme Court dealt with the question of
whether, in light of Alden, sovereign immunity barred claims against the State that
arose under the Takings Clause5 and the Contracts Clause6 of the U.S. Constitution.
In Manning, a landowner claimed that mining regulations had effected a taking,7 and
had also impaired the landowner's contractual obligations.8 The landowner sought
compensatory damages. 9 The court held that sovereign immunity precluded the
claim for damages brought under the Contracts Clause, but not the claim for
damages brought under the Takings Clause.'°
This Note examines the New Mexico Supreme Court's reasoning in Manning and
its implications for future claims brought against the State under the U.S.
Constitution. Part II of this Note reviews the history of sovereign immunity and the
current sovereign immunity doctrine. After a brief statement of the case in Part El
of this Note, Part IV explains and analyzes the reasoning of the court in reaching its
results. The court used two independent bases for its holding that the Takings Clause
abrogates sovereign immunity-it found abrogation based upon the unique nature
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1. E.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress may not abrogate a
State's sovereign immunity pursuant to its commerce powers); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)
(imposing limits upon when Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Congress may not abrogate a State's
immunity from suit in state court pursuant to its commerce powers); Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth.,
535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) (holding that sovereign immunity extends to administrative proceedings in which a State

is a party).
2. 527 U.S. 706.
3. See id. at 726-27, 754. The power to regulate interstate commerce is a power granted exclusively to
Congress by the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
4. 2006-NMSC-027, 144 P.3d 87, cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 663 (2006).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See infra notes 62-63.
See infra notes 64-65.
See infra note 66.
Manning v. Mining & Minerals Div., 2006-NMSC-027,

1, 144 P.3d 87, 88.
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of the Takings Clause,"1 and it analogized to a string of due process cases involving
tax refunds. 12 The court barred the Contracts Clause claim by rejecting a broad3
exception to sovereign immunity for claims based upon the Constitution itself.'
Finally, Part V examines the implications of the court's holding. This Note argues
that the court in Manning, by blocking Contracts Clause claims and abrogating
sovereign immunity for Takings Clause claims, made it very difficult for claimants
to seek monetary damages based upon constitutional violations other than the
Takings Clause.' 4 This difficulty arises because the attributes of the Takings Clause
are not shared by other constitutional provisions, 5 and because the due process/tax
refund theory is unlikely to be applicable in many situations outside the tax or
takings contexts.' 6 Finally, this Note suggests that, although the current political
climate regarding takings makes such a move unlikely, '7 the court's language leaves
litigants must follow in order
the door open for the State to alter the procedures 1that
8
taking.
a
of
light
in
damages
monetary
recover
to
I. BACKGROUND
The immunity that States enjoy from suit under the U.S. Constitution has long
been the subject of debate.' 9 While the history of that debate is not the subject of this
Note, some background is necessary to explain the current legal doctrine.
Article Il of the U.S. Constitution allows for federal jurisdiction over
controversies between States and citizens of another State. 2' At the time of the
ratification of the Constitution, the amenability of States to suit as defendants at the
hands of private individuals was debated; some framers believed Article IH
subjected States to suits from individuals,2 ' while others, including Alexander

11. See infra Part IV.A.2.
12. See infra Part IV.A.3.

13. See infra Part IV.B.
14. See infra Part V.
15. Infra Part V.
16. !nfra Part V.
17. See infra notes 281-283 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 160-163 and accompanying text.
19. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTIUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 2.10.2, at 187-93 (3d
ed. 2006) (outlining the competing theories of the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment).
Section 2, clause 1 states, in relevant part, "The judicial Power shall extend to all
20. The text of Article m1,
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and.. .to
Controversies... between a State and Citizens of another State.. .and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." Thus, the text of this clause seems to allow for suits between citizens of one
State and the government of another State, and between a State and foreign individuals. This clause also seems to
grant federal jurisdiction to hear all suits arising under the Constitution and Federal law, without any restrictions
on whom the parties to those suits may be.
21. Three framers who believed that Article III allowed for individuals to bring States into federal court were
Patrick Henry, Edmund Randolph, and James Wilson. During the Virginia ratification debates, Patrick Henry
provided for individual suits against States: "What says the
expressed his belief that the plain text of Article IlI
paper? That it shall have cognizance of controversies between a state and citizens of another state, without
discriminating between plaintiff and defendant." 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 543 (2d ed. 1861) (remarks of Patrick Henry) [hereinafter ELLIOr's
DEBATES].

Later in that debate, Edmund Randolph expressed a similar view: "I think, whatever the law of nations
may say, that any doubt respecting the construction that a state may be plaintiff, and not defendant, is taken away
by the words where a state shall be a party." 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra, at 573 (remarks of Edmund Randolph).
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Hamilton, James Madison, and John Marshall, believed that States could bring suits
as plaintiffs but could not be made to answer as defendants in suits with private
citizens.22 In Chisholm v. Georgia,23 the U.S. Supreme Court was faced with a suit
brought by an out-of-state plaintiff against the State of Georgia. 4 The Supreme
Court ruled 4 to 1 that the plaintiff could bring the suit under Article HI. 5 This
decision was followed quickly by the drafting and ratification of the Eleventh
Amendment, 26 which expressly forbids out-of-state plaintiffs from suing States in
federal court,27 thus overturning Chisholm.28 A century later, in Hans v. Louisiana,
the Supreme Court broadened the scope of the Eleventh Amendment to bar a federal
claim against a State brought by a citizen of that State.29 The Court in Hans
acknowledged that the plain text of the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the suit,
but rejected the alternative, that a State could be sued by one of its own citizens, as

During the Pennsylvania ratification debates, James Wilson expressed approval of the fact that
individuals and States would be on equal footing: "Impartiality is the leading feature in this Constitution; it pervades
the whole. When a citizen has a controversy with another state, there ought to be a tribunal where both parties may
stand on a just and equal footing." 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra, at 491 (remarks of James Wilson).
would cause States to be sued as defendants.
22. In the FederalistNo. 81, Hamilton denied that Article III
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without
its consent. This is the general sense, and the general practice of mankind; and the exemption,
as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every state in the
union.... [T]here is no colour to pretend that the state governments would, by the adoption of that
[Constitution], be divested of the privilege of paying their own debts in their own way, free from
every constraint but that which flows from the obligations of good faith.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, 417, 422-23 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001).
James Madison argued in the Virginia ratification debates, contrary to the assertions of Patrick Henry and
Edmund Randolph, supra note 21, that Article III only allowed States to sue individuals, but not vice versa:
Its jurisdiction in controversies between a state and citizens of another state is much objected to,
and perhaps without reason. It is not in the power of individuals to call any state into court. The
only operation it can have, is that, if a state should wish to bring a suit against a citizen, it must
be brought before the federal court.
3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 21, at 533 (remarks of James Madison). Later, in the Virginia debates, John
Marshall echoed Madison's view:
It
I hope that no gentleman will think that a state will be called at the bar of the federal court....
is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged before a court. The intent
is, to enable states to recover claims of individuals residing in other states.
3 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 2 1, at 555 (remarks of John Marshall).
23. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. The decision in Chisholm v. Georgia was announced in 1793, and the Eleventh Amendment was
endorsed by both Houses of Congress within two months of that decision. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 721
(1999). The draft was proposed to the legislatures of the States, and the requisite number of States ratified the
Amendment by February 7, 1795. Explanatory notes to U.S. CONST. amend. XI, in U.S.C.S. Constitution,
Amendment XI, at 872 (2001).
27. The Eleventh Amendment states, 'qheJudicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST.amend. XI. While this amendment forecloses
federal jurisdiction over suits brought by citizens of one State against the government of a different State, it is silent
on the possibility of suits between citizens and States arising under federal law or the Constitution and on the topic
of state court jurisdiction. For a lengthy opinion on the original intent of the founders on the topic of sovereign
immunity, including the intent of the drafters of the Eleventh Amendment, see Seminole Tribe of Floridav. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 100-68 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting). But see id. at 67-70 (majority opinion authored by Justice
Rehnquist critiquing Justice Souter's historical analysis). The majority in Alden analyzed the same historical issue
and arrived at the opposite conclusion. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713-43 (1999).
28. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 2.10.1, at 186-87.
29. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
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an "absurdity on its face., 30 In Hans, the Supreme Court interpreted the ratification
of the Eleventh Amendment as an indication of the Founders' intent that States be
protected against suits brought by private
individuals generally, not simply that they
31
be protected against diversity suits.
Taken literally, the sovereign immunity bar to private suits against States outlined
in Hans would immunize States entirely from private enforcement of federal
rights. 2 This consequence was mitigated soon after with the Supreme Court's
decision in Ex Parte Young,33 where the Court stated that a plaintiff could sue a
government actor to enjoin unconstitutional activity. 34 The "Ex Parte Young
doctrine" allows plaintiffs to sue individual state officials to prevent the ongoing
enforcement of unlawful or unconstitutional laws.35 Individuals may seek
declaratory or injunctive relief, but may not seek monetary damages.36 The doctrine
is premised upon the notion that when a public official performs an unlawful or
unconstitutional act, the official is no longer acting on behalf of the public and is
therefore stripped of immunity.37 This "fiction ' 38 retains its vitality because of its
utility in ensuring that governments do not run afoul of the Constitution.39
In addition to limitations imposed by the "Ex Parte Young" fiction, the reach of
sovereign immunity has been limited in several other respects. The doctrine only
protects state agencies and entities that can properly be considered the "State"
itself;4° it does not protect political subdivisions of a state. 4 ' Also, under certain

30. Id. at 15.
31. Id.
32. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 2.10.4.1, at 204; see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974)
("[Ex Parte Young] has permitted the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a sword, rather than
merely as a shield, for those whom they were designed to protect.").
33. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
34. Id. at 155-56.
35. LAURENcE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 3-25, at 535 (3d ed. 2000).
36. Id.
37. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60.
38. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 114 n.25 (1984).
39. Id. at 105. In recent years the Supreme Court has narrowed the Ex Parte Young doctrine. It has done so
by creating exceptions where the doctrine is inapplicable: (1) when prospective injunctive relief would impinge
upon a State's sovereign interests, Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261,283 (1997), and (2) when a federal
statute has its own comprehensive and exclusive enforcement mechanism. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 74 (1996). In Seminole Tribe the Court also characterized the doctrine as "narrow." Id. at 76.
40. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 2.10.3, at 197-200. It is sometimes difficult to predict whether
courts will treat entities as arms of the state for sovereign immunity purposes. Id. Chemerinsky cites four factors
that courts use in making that determination:
1) Will a judgment against the entity be satisfied with funds in the state treasury?
2) Does the state government exert significant control over the entity's decisions and actions?
3) Does the state executive branch or legislature appoint the entity's policymakers?
4) Does the state law characterize the entity as a state agency rather than as a subdivision?
Id. § 2.10.3, at 199 (citing John R. Pagan, Eleventh Amendment Analysis, 39 ARK. L. REv. 447, 461 (1986)).
41. JOHN E. NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.11, at 52 (7th ed. 2004). The term
"political subdivisions" includes municipal corporations, id.; counties, Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529,
530 (1890); and school boards, Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 281 (1977).
To add to the confusion of who constitutes the "State," suits filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (the
federal statute allowing for a private cause of action for violations of constitutional rights) must be brought against
a "person":
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage...subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
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circumstances, a party can bring an "officer suit" to recover directly from a
government officer if that officer has harmed the party. a
States may also waive sovereign immunity.4 3 Additionally, Congress may
abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its power to enforce civil rights under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Thus, sovereign immunity is not a strict
jurisdictional bar to suit against a State; it is more precisely characterized as a bar
to private suits4 5 against a State for monetary damages.
In the past two decades, state sovereign immunity has been expanded by the U.S.
Supreme Court. In 1996, the Court held in Seminole Tribe of Floridav. Floridathat
Congress cannot validly abrogate a State's sovereign immunity from private suits
for damages while exercising its powers to regulate commerce." In 1999, the Court
decided Alden v. Maine, which extended the constitutional protection of state
sovereign immunity to state courts.4 The Supreme Court in Alden held that
Congress, pursuant to its power to regulate interstate commerce, could not abrogate
a State's sovereign immunity in its own courts by creating a federal cause of action
against a State. 8 The Court explicitly stated that it was not enforcing the text of the

laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (emphasis added). This statute cannot be used to bring suits against a State because the
State is not a "person" under the meaning of the statute. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
However, municipal corporations and other local government bodies are "persons" and can be sued under the
statute. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
42. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 2.10.4.2, at 205. As a general matter, state indemnification of officer
suits does not serve to waive sovereign immunity. Id. Even though sovereign immunity poses no bar to recovery,
officers may be able to raise other immunity defenses. Id. § 2.10.4.2, at 206. Individuals performing judicial,
legislative, or prosecutorial functions may be entitled to absolute immunity from suit. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 8.6.2, at 516 (4th ed. 2003). Most other government officials are entitled to qualified
immunity against suits for damages, id. § 8.6.3, at 528-29, which generally means immunity for acts that do not
violate clearly established law of which a reasonable person would have known. Id. § 8.6.3, at 531 (quoting Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
43. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 41, § 2.11, at 56. In New Mexico, the State has waived sovereign
immunity for certain torts committed by government officials through the Tort Claims Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 41-4-1
to -27 (2006). The State covers the liability of government officials sued under the Act. Id. § 41-4-4(B) (2001).
44. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). There are significant limits to the scope of Congress's
ability to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Not only must the abrogation be clear and unequivocal, Blatchford
v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775,786 (1991), but Section 5 only affords Congress the power to "enforce"
the rights of the Fourteenth Amendment by "appropriate" legislation, City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519
(1997), which means that the congressional remedy must be congruent and proportional to the alleged violation of
constitutional rights. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533. Finally, Congress may have to show findings of such violations in
order to prove congruence and proportionality. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88-91 (2000).
45. Article III permits, and the Supreme Court hears, suits between States. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; NOWAK
& ROTUNDA, supra note 41, § 2.11, at 51. Additionally, the federal government can sue a State for a violation of
federal law. Id. § 2.11, at 5 1. It may do so even when the purpose of the federal suit is to protect private individuals.
Id.
46. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996). More precisely, the Court held that Congress
could not override the sovereign immunity of States when exercising its plenary power to regulate Indian commerce.
Id. However, since the power of Congress to regulate Indian commerce is more expansive than its powers to
regulate interstate commerce, the holding implies that Congress is also unable to abrogate sovereign immunity by
exercising its interstate commerce powers. Id. at 62-63.
47. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
48. Id. The federal act in question was the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988).
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Eleventh Amendment; 49 rather, a State's immunity from suit in its own courts was
considered a "fundamental attribute of... sovereignty" 50 at the time of the founding,"'
and that the U.S. Constitution structurally protects the sovereignty of the States.52
The Court acknowledged that this sovereignty is not complete,53 and that the States
surrendered some of it in the plan of the convention.54 However, the States had not
surrendered their sovereign immunity when it came to causes of action created by
Congress.
Alden caused a stir among Supreme Court commentators,5 6 who had previously
assumed that constitutional sovereign immunity only protected States from suit in
federal court.57 However, because the case only dealt directly with the power of
Congress to abrogate sovereign immunity pursuant to its interstate commerce power,
it did not directly address the scope and structure of state sovereign immunity in the
context of claims brought under the Constitution itself.5 8 That question-the
applicability of sovereign immunity to cases for damages arising directly under the
Constitution-was the issue before the New Mexico Supreme Court in Manning v.
Mining & Minerals Division.

49. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712-13. Because constitutional sovereign immunity from suit in state court does not
come from the Eleventh Amendment, I refrain from using the term "Eleventh Amendment immunity" in this Note.
Instead, I simply use the term "sovereign immunity." This use of "sovereign immunity" raises the issue of potential
ambiguity with common-law sovereign immunity, which has been abolished in New Mexico. See Cockrell v. Bd.
of Regents of N.M. State Univ., 2002-NMSC-009, 12, 45 P.3d 876, 882 (discussing Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588,
544 P.2d 1153 (1975)). Because common-law sovereign immunity has been abolished, however, I feel that it is
somewhat unnecessary for the purposes of this Note to distinguish between the two by name.
50. Alden, 527 U.S. at 713.
51. Id. at 715.
52. Id. at714-15.
53. Id. at 715 ("[States] retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty.").
54. Id. at 730-31.
55. Id. at 754.
56. Much of the scholarly reaction to Alden has been hostile. E.g., Daan Braveman, Enforcement of Federal
Rights Against States: Alden and Federalism Non-Sense, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 611,613 (2000) (arguing that Alden
has jeopardized the enforcement of civil rights against States, thereby disrupting federalism's balance between state
and federal interests); Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1203 (2001)
(arguing that the "entire body of law" governing sovereign immunity is wrong and should be abolished); Vicki C.
Jackson, Principleand Compromise in ConstitutionalAdjudication: The Eleventh Amendment andState Sovereign
Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 953, 953 (2000) (arguing that recent sovereign immunity jurisprudence is
"compelled neither by history nor logic"); Joan Meyler, A Matter of Misinterpretation,State Sovereign Immunity,
and Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence:The Supreme Court'sReformation of the Constitution in Seminole Tribe
and its Progeny, 45 How. L.J. 77, 78 (2001) (challenging the validity of the historical evidence used to justify recent
sovereign immunity decisions).
Not all scholarly commentary has been negative. See, e.g., Alfred Hill, In Defense of Our Law of
Sovereign Immunity, 42 B.C. L. REV. 485 (2001) (arguing that a robust sovereign immunity doctrine is consistent
with the original intent of the founders).
57. See, e.g., PETER W. LOW & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE
RELATIONS 880, 887-90 (3d ed. 1994) (discussing various interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment as restrictions
on the federal judicial power).
58. Alden did address the validity of Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), which was a case brought
directly under the Contracts Clause. See infra notes 258-259. Alden also briefly addressed the validity of Reich v.
Collins, 513 U.S. 106 (1994), which was a claim for damages brought under the Due Process Clause. See infra note
210 and accompanying text. Therefore, Alden was not entirely silent on the topic of claims brought under the
Constitution itself.

Summer 2007]

MANNING V. MINING & MINERALS

m1I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 2006, the New Mexico Supreme Court heard an appeal from the Mannings, a
family owning mining and milling properties in southwestern New Mexico. 59 The
family sued the State,' claiming two constitutional violations. 61 First, they claimed
that mining regulations put into place while their milling operation was dormant
effectively prevented them from putting the mine to any economically profitable
use, 62 resulting in a "regulatory taking" in violation of the Takings Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.63 The family also claimed that these regulations, which prevented
them from operating the mining and milling sites, had therefore prevented them
from meeting existing contractual obligations, 6' thus violating the Contracts
Clause.65 They sought $6.5 million in compensatory damages. 66

59. Manning v. Mining & Minerals Div., 2006-NMSC-027, [ 2, 144 P.3d 87, 88.
60. Id. 1 4, 144 P.3d at 88. More precisely, they sued the state agencies responsible for the enforcement of
mining laws and regulations: the Mining and Minerals Division of the Energy, Minerals, and Natural Resources
Department, and the Environment Department. Id. I [ 3-4, 144 P.3d at 88. There was no issue about whether the
agencies were "arms of the state" for sovereign immunity purposes. For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to these
parties collectively as "the State" in this Note.
61. Id. [2,4, 144 P.3d at 88.
62. Id. 4, 144 P.3d at 88. Specifically, the Mannings complained that they could not operate the mining
and milling site because they had not met the bonding and reclamation requirements set out in the Mining Act and
its regulations. The Mannings claimed that the proper value of the required bond was impossible to determine
without the mine actually being in operation. Thus, according to the Mannings, the mine was effectively
permanently barred from opening. Id.
63. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the taking of property
for public use without just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nior shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.").
There are several different types of takings that can occur. The simplest is a taking by reason of seizure
or physical invasion of property. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan Catv Corp., 458 U.S. 419,425 (1982). Takings
can also occur as a result of conditions imposed upon property by regulatory acts of the State. NOWAK & ROTUNDA,
supra note 41, § 11.12, at 509; Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). A regulatory taking may involve
a partial deprivation of the use of property. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994). It may also
involve the complete deprivation of all economically beneficial use of property, and thus constitute a total regulatory
taking. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). Finally, if property is seized or impaired
temporarily, such act may constitute a temporary taking. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318-19 (1987). In such cases, the property owner is entitled to compensation for the
partial loss of the property. Id.
64. Manning, 2006-NMSC-027, 2, 144 P.3d at 88. According to the Mannings, they "had well-established
contractual rights and obligations with third parties to explore and develop mineral reserves adjacent to and
necessary for" the mining operation. Plaintiffs/Petitioners Brief-In-Chief at 6, Manning v. Mining & Minerals Div.,
2006-NMSC-027, 144 P.3d 87 (No. 28,500). The Mannings further claimed that the Mining Act and its regulations
impaired the implementation of these contracts. Id.
65. Unlike the Takings Clause, the Contracts Clause was explicitly written as a check upon the States: "No
State shall.. .pass any... law impairing the obligation of contracts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. Courts use a very
deferential standard to evaluate claims arising under the Contracts Clause: in order for a State to violate the
Contracts Clause with respect to a private contract, the state action must substantially impair the contract, and such
action must lack a reasonable relationship with a "significant and legitimate public purpose." Energy Reserves
Group v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-13 (1983). State action impairing contracts to which a State
is a party, however, will receive a more skeptical review. U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1977).
66. Manning, 2006-NMSC-027,
4, 144 P.3d at 88. The Manning opinion is unclear regarding the
apportionment of that amount between the Takings Clause claim and the Contracts Clause claim.
Under the Takings Clause, individuals are entitled to "just compensation" for their losses. U.S. CONST.
amend. V. Just compensation is measured as the amount lost by the private property owner, not the amount gained
by the government. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 235-36 (2003). With a regulatory taking, that
amount should be the value of the property interest impaired by the regulation. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 396 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (stating that the dollar value of the property interest in that case was not disclosed in the record, but
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At the trial court level, the State moved for summary judgment based upon both
ripeness and sovereign immunity, and the trial court granted summary judgment on
ripeness grounds.67 The Mannings appealed, and the New Mexico Court of Appeals
affirmed the grant of summary judgment, but on sovereign immunity grounds, not
ripeness.68 The Mannings then petitioned the New Mexico Supreme Court for
certiorari to reverse the sovereign immunity issue, and certiorari was granted. 69
IV. RATIONALE/ANALYSIS
The New Mexico Supreme Court in Manning examined the Takings and
Contracts Clause claims in turn, addressing whether they were barred by sovereign
immunity. With respect to the Takings Clause claim, the court employed arguments
that prior U.S. Supreme Court precedent supported the notion that sovereign
immunity did not bar takings claims.70 While some of the court's reasoning involved
interpreting Supreme Court silence on the topic, which is problematic in a field of
changing law, 7' the court did find support from dicta in prior takings opinions.72

that it would be "the dollar value of petitioner Florence Dolan's interest in excluding the public" from the property
segment in question).
The request for monetary damages for a Contracts Clause claim is somewhat unusual. Because the clause
only prohibits the impairment of contractual obligations, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, most recent Supreme Court
Contracts Clause cases have involved requests for injunctive relief. See, e.g., Energy Reserves Group, 459 U.S. at
408-09 (request for declaratory judgment regarding contractual rights); Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438
U.S. 234, 239-40 (1978) (suit for declaratory and injunctive relief); U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 25-26 (suit for
declaratory relief); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 418 (1934) (petition for stay pursuant to
statute).
67. Manning, 2006-NMSC-027, 1 5, 144 P.3d at 88-89. For the dissent's argument that the case was not
ripe, see infra note 69.
68. Manning, 2006-NMSC-027, 5, 144 P.3d at 89.
69. Id. Justices Minzner and Maes dissented from the opinion on the grounds that the case was not ripe. Id.
53, 144 P.3d at 99 (Minzner, Maes, J.J., dissenting). The dissent relied upon prudential considerations for deciding
the case on ripeness grounds: "The majority...has followed the Court of Appeals.. into what appears to be a thicket
of constitutional jurisprudence. I prefer to stay on a safer path and leave the task of cutting through the mass of
federalism, takings, and sovereign immunity holdings for another day, and another court." Id.
The dissent made the point that ripeness furnishes a much cleaner method of settling the case than trying
to sort out conflicting and contradictory constitutional doctrines. Id. 53-54, 144 P.3d at 99. The dissent went on
to argue that the case was not ripe because the Mannings' mining operations were hampered by an injunction issued
by a federal judge in a separate proceeding, meaning that in the absence of the complained-of state regulations, they
still would not be able to mine the property. Id. 1 55, 144 P.3d at 99. More seriously, the Mannings had failed to
complete the State's permit application process, making their claims of a total deprivation of economic use
speculative. Id.
The majority may have sidestepped the ripeness issue because Alden and the resurgence of state
sovereign immunity created an important open question of constitutional law, a question that demanded the court's
attention. One of the articulated grounds for granting certiorari is when "the decision of the court of
appeals...involves a significant question of law under the Constitution of New Mexico or the United States." NMSA
1978, § 34-5-14(B)(3) (1972). Additionally, if the ripeness issue were resolved and the Mannings were able to
continue with their litigation, the sovereign immunity issue might well come up in a future stage of the proceedings.
Thus, avoiding the sovereign immunity question would only serve to delay resolution of the issue and perpetuate
uncertainties for the parties involved in the lawsuit. Cf. Reg'l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 143-45
(1974) (holding that the case was ripe because uncertainty regarding the constitutionality of the legislative scheme
might have impacted decisions made by interested parties, and further factual development would not have assisted
the Court in answering the legal question involved).
70. See infra Part W.A.l.a.
71. See infra Part IV.A.l.b.
72. See infra Part W.A. L.b.
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The Manning court went beyond these statements and grounded its holding in
arguments that the unique text and purpose of the Takings Clause required the court
to abrogate sovereign immunity. 73 In particular, the court found that the Takings
Clause is self-executing (and therefore needs no statutory enactment to be
operative) 7a and that its purpose would be subverted if sovereign immunity could act
as a bar to takings suits. 75 These arguments, however, necessarily only apply in the
context of takings claims, and so serve to limit the reach of the holding.76 The
opinion gives the State considerable leeway in altering the procedures used in
adjudicating takings claims.77
The court also used the Due Process Clause to abrogate sovereign immunity in
the takings context by analogizing to a line of cases involving tax refunds. 78 The
Due Process Clause supplied a separate, independent basis for abrogating sovereign
immunity.79
Finally, the court rejected the Contracts Clause claim on the grounds that it lacked
the textual remedy of the Takings Clause. 80 The court found significant Alden's
favorable treatment of Hans v. Louisiana8' and in so doing rejected the idea, raised
earlier in the Manning opinion, that Alden should be read only to block causes of
action created by Congress. 82
A. Takings Clause Claims
1. Prior U.S. Supreme Court (Non) Treatment of the Issue
a. The Court's Reasoning
The Manning court drew support from U.S. Supreme Court precedent in two
ways. First, it noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had failed to indicate concern with
sovereign immunity in its recent treatment of takings cases against States.83 Second,
the Manning court found language from other Supreme Court precedent suggesting
that sovereign immunity might not apply in the takings context.8
The Manning court first demonstrated that the current claim was similar, in terms
of the identity of the defendant, to recent "regulatory takings" cases that the U.S.
Supreme Court had decided on their merits. 5 The court identified Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council,86 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,87 and Tahoe-Sierra

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See infra Part IV.A.2.a.
See infra Part IV.A.2.a.
See infra Part IV.A.2.a.
See infra Part IV.A.2.b.
See infra Part IV.A.2.b.
See infra Part IV.A.3.a.
See infra Part IV.A.3.b.
See infra Part 1V.B.1.
See infra Part IV.B.1.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
See Manning v. Mining & Minerals Div., 2006-NMSC-027, 1 12, 144 P.3d 87, 90.
Id. - 16-17, 144 P.3d at 90-91.
ld. 9 13-16, 18, 144 P.3d at 90-91.
505 U.S. 1003 (1992). In Lucas, a landowner alleged a taking after a state agency, enforcing a statute
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Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency 88 as examples of
cases between individuals and state agencies, and noted that sovereign immunity
never arose as an issue in any of them.89 If sovereign immunity had been a valid bar
to a takings suit, the court reasoned, then surely it would have come up in at least
one of these cases. 9°
The court also noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has hinted that sovereign
immunity may be inapplicable in the takings context. 9 t The Manning court cited a
much-scrutinized footnote in FirstEnglish EvangelicalLutheran Church v. County
of Los Angeles that suggests the inapplicability of sovereign immunity principles to
takings claims.92 The Manning court also discussed a later statement in a different

case that pointedly left open the issue of sovereign immunity and takings. 93

designed to protect against coastal erosion, prevented him from building a house on his beachfront property. Id. at
1007-09. The Court remanded the case with the instruction to find a complete regulatory taking unless the State
could show that Lucas would have been liable for nuisance or violation of some other common law tort had he
constructed the house. Id. at 1031.
87. 533 U.S. 606 (2001). In Palazzolo, the petitioner formed a corporation and bought three parcels of land
for development purposes that consisted, in part, of salt marshes. Id. at 613. The corporation was unable to secure
approval to develop the land. Id. at 613-14. Subsequently, the State enacted regulations protecting coastal wetlands.
Id. at 614. After the enactment of the regulations, the corporation's charter was revoked for failure to pay taxes and
title to the land passed to the petitioner. Id. The petitioner attempted to develop the land again and was denied in
part because his plans would conflict with the wetlands regulations now in effect. Id. at 614-15. The petitioner then
sued for a regulatory taking, and the U.S. Supreme Court held that his suit was ripe notwithstanding the fact that
he had not personally owned the property at the time the regulations were enacted. Id. at 630.
88. 535 U.S. 302 (2002). In Tahoe-Sierra,a regional planning agency created by compact between the States
of California and Nevada imposed two moratoria on development at Lake Tahoe while the agency studied the
impact of development and created an environmentally sound growth strategy. Id. at 306. A corporation representing
2,000 landowners claimed that the moratoria constituted a regulatory taking. Id. at 312. Applying a balancing test,
the Court found that the moratoria, under those circumstances, did not constitute a taking. Id. at 320.
89. Manning, 2006-NMSC-027, T 16, 18, 144 P.3d at 90-91. In Palazzolo,a brief amicus curiae did suggest
a sovereign immunity defense, but the Court did not address that argument in its opinion. Brief for the Board of
County Commissioners of the County of La Plata, Colo., et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Respondents State
of Rhode Island, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (No. 99-2047), 2001 WL 15620, at 20-21; Eric
Berger, The Collision of the Takings and State Sovereign Immunity Doctrines,63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 493, 496
(2006).
90. See Manning, 2006-NMSC-027,1 12, 144 P.3d at 90.
91. See id. 17, 144 P.3d at 91.
92. Id. (citing First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 316 n.9
(1987)). In FirstEnglish, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the question of whether a State could prevent the
recovery of monetary damages in temporary regulatory takings for the time period prior to the determination that
a taking had occurred. FirstEnglish,482 U.S. at 306-07. The Court held that it could not. Id. at 319. In a footnote,
the Court seemed to dismiss the notion that sovereign immunity had any relevance to that question, insisting instead
that the remedy for a taking was just compensation, as provided in the Constitution itself:
The Solicitor General urges that the prohibitory nature of the Fifth Amendment, combined with
principles of sovereign immunity, establishes that the Amendment itself is only a limitation on
the power of the Government to act, not a remedial provision. The cases cited in the text, we
think, refute the argument of the United States that "the Constitution does not, of its own force,
furnish a basis for a court to award money damages against the government." Though arising in
various factual and jurisdictional settings, these cases make clear that it is the Constitution that
dictates the remedy for interference with property rights amounting to a taking.
Id. at 316 n.9 (citations omitted).
It should be emphasized, however, that the applicability of sovereign immunity to the Takings Clause was not
even the question the footnote sought to answer-the Court assumed that the church could sue, and the only
question was whether they could recover monetary damages. See Richard H. Seamon, The Asymmetry of State
Sovereign Immunity, 76 WASH. L. REv. 1067, 1072-77 (2001). For a partial list of commentators who have
interpreted the footnote, see infra note 106.
93. Manning, 2006-NMSC-027, 1 17 n.3, 144 P.3d at 91 n.3 (citing City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes
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Thus, the court reasoned, both the U.S. Supreme Court's continued acceptance
of takings suits against state agencies and its dicta on the topic suggested that
sovereign immunity is inapplicable in takings cases,94 recent sovereign immunity
cases (Alden in particular) notwithstanding. 95
b. Analysis
The danger with using the absence of Supreme Court comment on an issue is that
one might ignore differences in procedural posture that can determine whether
sovereign immunity applies.96 An important factor in assessing the applicability of
sovereign immunity is whether the State has agreed to waive its sovereign immunity
defense (either by not raising the defense in litigation or by having a statutory
waiver/mechanism for bringing takings claims). If a State has waived its sovereign
immunity defense, then the fact that the case is heard on its merits is hardly support
for a lack of sovereign immunity.97 Unfortunately, the opinions in these cases do not
give enough detail about their procedural posture and do not provide enough detail
about the then-existing state statutes governing takings claims to conclusively
determine whether, in fact, sovereign immunity would have even been at issue.
Nonetheless, the complete lack of discussion of the issue of sovereign immunity in
those cases might furnish some support for the idea that it does not survive in
takings cases.
A related problem is that sovereign immunity doctrine has recently undergone
considerable change98 and attorneys would not have thought to raise constitutional
sovereign immunity defenses in state court prior to Alden. 99 Before Alden, the U.S.

at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 714 (1999)). Del Monte Dunes involved the right to a jury trial in inverse
condemnation proceedings brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 694. Discussing
the rationales used to justify the lack of a jury trial in direct condemnation proceedings, a plurality dismissed the
"sovereign immunity rationale," or the rationale that a government could institute proceedings without a jury
because it could refuse consent to a trial in the first place, as inapplicable to cases involving municipalities that
lacked sovereign immunity. Id. at 714. The Court's language also suggested that this "sovereign immunity
rationale" was inappropriate in takings cases: "Even if the sovereign immunity rationale retains its vitality in cases
where this Amendment is applicable, cf FirstEnglish, 482 U.S. at 316, n.9...." Id. (emphasis added).
94. Manning, 2006-NMSC-027,
12, 16, 144 P.3d at 90.
95. Id. 32, 144 P.3d at 94.
96. The contours of sovereign immunity are outlined in Part 1H,supra.
97. In its answer brief in Manning, the State highlighted this procedural issue by distinguishing the
procedural posture of prior U.S. Supreme Court takings cases. Answer Brief of Defendants/Respondents at 27 n. 18,
Manning, 2006-NMSC-027, 144 P.3d 87 (No. 28,500). In particular, the State argued that Palazzolo v. Rhode Island
is inapposite because the claim was brought as an inverse condemnation action under state law. Id. (citing Palazzolo
v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 615 (2001)). The actual opinion in Palazzolo does say that the plaintiffs brought an
"inverse condemnation" action in that case, but does not explicitly say that they followed a state statute or procedure
in doing so. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 615. The term "inverse condemnation" typically encompasses all suits brought
by private parties alleging compensation for takings when condemnation proceedings have not yet been
implemented, not simply those pursuant to a statutory scheme. See United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257
(1980).
The State's attempts to distinguish Lucas and Tahoe-Sierra, the other two Supreme Court cases cited
by the Manning court for their silence on sovereign immunity, are less persuasive. The State simply argues that the
cases do not address sovereign immunity. Answer Brief of Defendants/Respondents, supra, at 27 n. 18. Of course,
this would seem to lend support to the court's position that sovereign immunity has always been assumed to be
inapplicable in takings cases. Manning, 2006-NMSC-027, 1 16, 144 P.3d at 90.
98. For a description of the evolution of sovereign immunity doctrine, see supra Part H.
99. The Alden majority explicitly recognized this drawback to using prior cases as evidence of implicit
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Supreme Court had only enforced sovereign immunity in federal court."° Thus,
Lucas, which was decided prior to Alden,' °' probably has limited value in predicting
the current applicability of sovereign immunity.
However, the same drawback arguably does not apply to the use of prior explicit
Supreme Court statements on the subject. The court in Manning identified the two
significant statements made by the Supreme Court in the past two decades: the
footnote in FirstEnglish that arguments grounded in sovereign immunity might not
be applicable in the takings context"°2 and the later statement in Del Monte Dunes
that the applicability of sovereign immunity to takings cases was still an open
question. 03
'
The FirstEnglish footnote was purely dictum,'1 4 since the defendant in that case
was not even the "State" for sovereign immunity purposes and the ability to sue was
not in question.'I 5 Nonetheless, some commentators interpreted this dictum as a sign
that the Takings Clause abrogated sovereign immunity.' 6 Of course, the later
statement in Del Monte Dunes made clear that the issue was open,'0 7 but even that
statement was made in the context of rejecting a sovereign immunity rationale for
denying a jury trial in inverse condemnation proceedings. 0 8 Thus, these statements
do seem to carry some significance in terms of the Supreme Court's thinking on the
applicability of sovereign immunity to takings claims.
These cases were decided before Alden v. Maine, and thus their predictive power
might be weakened because of the expansion of sovereign immunity heralded by
Alden.' °9However, Del Monte Dunes was decided one month before Alden," ° so it

acknowledgement by the Court of a lack of sovereign immunity in state courts. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 737
(1999). This argument may undercut the Alden Court's claim that it was applying a principle of constitutional
jurisprudence that had been assumed for a long time. Id. at 746-48.
On a related note, the U.S. Supreme Court has been explicit in certain recent cases about the fact that
it is creating "new law" and that new doctrines should not always be applied retroactively. Richard H. Fallon, Jr.
& Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity,and ConstitutionalRemedies, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1733, 1733-35
(1991) (stating that the Supreme Court has limited the retroactive effect of its rulings in certain areas, including
criminal procedure, habeas corpus proceedings, qualified immunity, and the Dormant Commerce Clause). While
the precise issue of retroactivity has little bearing on this case (or on takings in general), the fact that the Supreme
Court is willing to suspend the retroactive application of its holdings indicates that using silence in precedent may
have its drawbacks.
100. See supranotes 56-57 and accompanying text.
101. Lucas was decided in 1992. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Alden was decided
in 1999. Alden, 527 U.S. 706.
102. Manning, 2006-NMSC-027, 1 17, 144 P.3d at 91 (citing First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 316 n.9 (1987)).
103. Id. 17 n.3, 155 P.2d at 91 n.3 (citing City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S.
687, 713-14 (1999)).
104. See supranote 92.
105. See supranote 92.
106. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 35, § 3-23, at 484; Eric Grant, A Revolutionary View of the Seventh
Amendment and the Just Compensation Clause, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 144, 205 (1996); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme
Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 115 n.454 (1988); Thomas W.
Merrill, The Landscape of ConstitutionalProperty, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 981 (2000).
107. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 713-14.
108. Id.
109. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
110. Alden was decided June 23, 1999, while Del Monte Dunes was decided May 24, 1999. Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706 (1999); Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687.
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is somewhat unrealistic to believe that the Court was completely unaware of the
implications of Alden when it wrote Del Monte Dunes.
It is more likely that the dicta in First English and Del Monte Dunes do provide
some insight into the Supreme Court's view of the interplay between the Takings
Clause and sovereign immunity. In this light, the N.M. court gave the statements an
appropriate degree of weight. While the court did not follow the lead of certain
commentators who decided that the statement in FirstEnglish settled the question, ,'
it used the statements as appropriate indicators of the Supreme Court's views on the
subject.
2. Unique Nature of the Takings Clause
a. The Court's Reasoning
The Manning court argued that the text of the Fifth Amendment mandates a
remedy of just compensation," 12 and that the purpose of the Takings Clause within
the constitutional scheme would be subverted if private takings claims for damages
against the State were blocked by sovereign immunity." 3
The court opened this structural argument by asserting that the Takings Clause
is "[an essential element of individual liberty"'" whose purpose is "to ensure the
protection of private property from an overreaching government." ' 5 Significantly,
the Manning court continued, the Founders chose a specific remedy for takings
violations: just compensation." 6
The court noted that the State, through statutes, allows for compensation when
property is taken under the power of eminent domain." 7 The State attempted to
argue that eminent domain represented a limited consent to suit on the part of the
State that left sovereign immunity intact for other types of takings," 8 but the court
rejected the idea that the State could avoid having to pay any compensation unless
the State consented to suit.' 9 Since New Mexico has only consented to suit in the
case of eminent domain, 20 and not in the case of regulatory takings, the court
concluded that requiring the State to consent to suit would essentially eliminate any
recovery for regulatory takings.' 2' This, the court continued, was contrary to the
spirit of the Takings Clause, which sought to compensate all landowners for all
types of takings.' 22

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
regulation
however,
144-148.
122.

See supra note 106.
See infra notes 116, 133-134 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 114-122 and accompanying text.
Manning v. Mining & Minerals Div., 2006-NMSC-027, 10, 144 P.3d 87, 89.
Id. 1 10, 144 P.3d at 89-90 (citations omitted).
Id. 10, 144 P.3d at 90.
Id. 19, 144 P.3d at 91.
Id. 20, 144 P.3d at 91.
Id. 121, 144 P.3d at 91-92.
Id.
Id. 1 22, 144 P.3d at 92. As explained above, a landowner could enjoin the enforcement of an onerous
under Ex Parte Young. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text. Such a course of action would,
leave the landowner uncompensated for the period during which the land was taken. See infra notes
See Manning, 2006-NMSC-027,

22, 144 P.3d at 92.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

In discussing the eminent domain argument, the court also stated a proposition
that may have a significant impact on future takings lawsuits. While arguing that a
statute is not necessary for someone to bring an inverse condemnation claim, the
court stated, "We are not suggesting that the legislature cannot prescribe terms and
conditions that govern recovery under the Takings Clause, such as Section 42A-129. When a statutory framework provides for recovery, individuals must abide by
it."123

The court subsequently dealt with the related issue of whether the Takings Clause
was self-executing. 24 The State argued by analogy to the statute enabling takings
claims against the federal government and claimed that a similar statute was
necessary to make the Takings Clause operative against the state government. 125 In
responding to this argument, the court assumed that the State was arguing that
analogous congressional action would be necessary to make the Takings Clause
operative against the State. 126 The court easily concluded that no other court requires
congressional action to make the Takings Clause operative against the States, 27 and
of the Takings Clause would not be
it also concluded that the text and purpose
28
served by requiring an operative statute.1
If the Takings Clause were not self-executing, the court reasoned, takings victims
would have to rely upon discretionary government action (i.e., statutory consent to
suit) in order to protect themselves against "abusive governmental power,"'' 29 thus
underlying takings doctrine 30 protection from an "overundermining the principle
' 13
reaching government.

1

Furthermore, the fact that the Constitution explicitly mentions the remedy for a
taking led the court to conclude that the Takings Clause was self-executing.' 32 The
Takings Clause is nearly unique in having a specific remedy mandated by the
Constitution, 133 and that uniqueness, argued the court, indicates that the framers
intended for the remedy to apply to all takings clams."3 Allowing legislatures to

123. Id. 121, 144 P.3d at 91.
124. Black's Law Dictionarydefines "self-executing" as "effective immediately without the need of any type
of implementing action." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1391 (8th ed. 2004).
125. Manning, 2006-NMSC-027, 41,144 P.3d at 96.
126. Id. 1 43, 144 P.3d at 96-97. This was not exactly the State's position. In its brief, the State argued that
analogous legislation by the New Mexico Legislature would suffice to abrogate sovereign immunity: "[T]he Tucker
Act... waived the federal government sovereign immunity... .By analogy, a similar waiver must be enacted by the
New Mexico Legislature in order to abrogate the State's immunity." Answer Brief of Defendants/Respondents,
supra note 97, at 24.
However, the court's characterization of the State's argument was ultimately of little import, because
the court's reasoning-that the Takings Clause should not require further government action to be operative-would
43, 144 P.3d at
apply to state legislative action as well as congressional action. Manning, 2006-NMSC-027,

96-97.
127. Manning, 2006-NMSC-027,
128. Id.
129. Id. 43, 144 P.3d at 97.

43, 144 P.3d at 96-97.

130. Id.
131. Id. 10, 144 P.3d at 90.
132. Id. V 46-47, 144 P.3d at 97-98.
133. Id. (citing RIcHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S

THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 796-97 (5th ed. 2003)). In particular, the only other constitutional
provision that mandates a remedy is the Habeas Corpus Clause. Id. 146, 144 P.3d at 97.
134. Id. 46-47, 144 P.3d at 97-98.
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block the remedy by requiring enabling legislation would be inconsistent with this
original intent.'35
The court also emphasized the unique nature of the Takings Clause in refuting
one of the State's claims, namely that the incorporation of the Fifth Amendment
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not serve to
abrogate state sovereign immunity for individual suits 136 because such abrogation
can only result from congressional action pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 3 7 The Manning court responded to the State's argument by
characterizing Section 5 as a provision allowing Congress to act when necessary to
enforce the civil rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.138 Such a provision
is necessary, the court stated, because the substantive protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment, including the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause,
lack remedies of their own. 39 However, when the constitutional provision in
question does have its own remedy, that provision is self-executing '4 and amounts
to a constitutional abrogation of state sovereign immunity. 41
In summary, the court characterized the Takings Clause as a check upon state
power and found that a sovereign immunity bar to takings claims would directly
contravene the purpose of the Clause. The court found significant the fact that the
Constitution expressly provides for the remedy of just compensation. Further, the
court decided that the text of the Constitution makes the Takings Clause selfexecuting and that the constitutional requirement of just compensation for all
takings mandated that property owners should be able to sue for all types of takings,
not just for those to which the State has consented to suit.
b. Analysis
In finding that the Takings Clause abrogates sovereign immunity by its own
power, the Manning court arrived at the same conclusion as every other court to
have considered the issue, 14 2 as well as at least one commentator. 143 The court's
textual and structural arguments about the Takings Clause counteracted a serious
problem identified by the Manning court that arises with the imposition of sovereign
immunity: certain classes of takings might essentially be denied any meaningful
remedy.'" While the court may have overstated the impact of sovereign immunity
upon the ability of citizens to counteract takings (for instance, a property owner
might be able to obtain injunctive relief that would prevent the unconstitutional

135. Id.
136. See supranote 44.
137.
138.

See supranote 44.
Manning, 2006-NMSC-027, 1 45, 144 P.3d at 97.

139. Id. Of course, as the tax refund cases, infra notes 191-192 and accompanying text, illustrate, the Due
Process Clause alone can still abrogate sovereign immunity and dictate a specific monetary remedy in the absence
of a remedy outlined in the Constitution.
140. Manning, 2006-NMSC-027, 46, 144 P.3d at 98.
141. Id. [51, 144 P.3d at 98.
142. DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511 (2004); Boise Cascade Corp. v. State ex rel. Or. State Bd. of
Forestry, 991 P.2d 563 (Or. Ct. App. 1999); SDDS, Inc. v. South Dakota, 650 N.w.2d I (S.D. 2002).
143. Berger, supra note 89, at 592-93.
144. See id. at 525-26.
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taking of property without compensation),' 45 there are still situations where
sovereign immunity would effectively block any meaningful remedy. For example,
in the context of temporary takings where the taking has ceased and the property
owner demands compensation for the time period when the taking occurred,
monetary damages are the only remedy that will compensate the loss."4 Of course,
property owners might be able to sue individual government officers for monetary
damages.' 47 However, this remedy is not as reliable as a suit against the State, 48 and
in cases such as this, where the complained-of act is a state law, it may be difficult
to identify an individual officer to sue. Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court
49
emphasized in FirstEnglish that the remedy for all takings is just compensation,
thus rendering problematic any result allowing for compensation for certain classes
of takings and not for others. 50 The New Mexico Supreme Court in Manning also
found, in response to arguments from the State that statutory consent to suit was
necessary to make the Takings Clause operative, that the Takings Clause is selfexecuting.l5 ' The purpose of the Takings Clause-to check government-would be
stymied if it required government action to become operative.'52
The court in Manning also relied upon the intent of the framers to provide
property owners with robust protection, including the guarantee of a specific
constitutional remedy. 53 This argument is strong in terms of distinguishing the
Takings Clause from the rest of the Constitution, which is relevant for avoiding
Hans v. Louisiana.5 There is, however, a counterargument. At the time of the
founding, individuals could not sue governments directly for a taking.' 55 Instead,
they could sue individual governmental officers for trespass, and if the governmental
officers attempted to raise the defense that they were authorized by statute to commit
the invasion, the property owner would have been able to invalidate that defense if
the statute failed to provide for just compensation. 56 Thus, the framers could not
have intended that, notwithstanding sovereign immunity, citizens would be able to
sue governments directly for just compensation."'

145. Id. at 526. This would occur through the use of the Ex ParteYoung doctrine. See supra notes 33-39.
146. See Berger, supra note 89, at 526-27.
147. See supranote 42 and accompanying text.
148. Some of the drawbacks to this remedy include individual immunities to suit such as qualified immunity
and official immunity. See supra note 42.
149. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987).
150. Manning v. Mining & Minerals Div., 2006-NMSC-027, 21, 144 P.3d 87, 91-92.
151. Id. 143, 144 P.3d at 97.
152. Id.
153. See supra notes 132-135 and accompanying text.
154. Hans v. Louisiana blocked a claim from being brought under the Contracts Clause. For a discussion of
the holding of Hans, see supranotes 29-31 and accompanying text. For an examination of how Alden affirmed the
holding and reasoning of Hans, see infra notes 258-259.
155. Robert Brauneis, The First ConstitutionalTort: The Remedial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century State
Just Compensation Law, 52 VAN. L. REv. 57, 60 (1999).
According to Professor Brauneis, there were some exceptions to the general rule that States could not
be sued. See id. at 69-70. Some States had early versions of eminent domain statutes under which plaintiffs could
recover for takings; these statutes would preclude officer suits. lId
156. Id. at 67-68.
157. Hill, supra note 56, at 497.
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Of course, such a counterargument could be used to invalidate all "inverse
condemnation" suits for takings. 58 Yet, it is difficult to imagine the purpose of such
a blanket prohibition. The officer suit prevalent at the time of the founding would
be a less secure and less reliable alternative method of securing just compensation.' 59
The interest protected by the Fifth Amendment is the right to own private property,
and just compensation remains the only remedy for an invasion of that interest.
Simply because inverse condemnation suits are a more effective manner of
protecting that interest than were the causes of action available at the time of the
founding does not mean that they should be unprotected by the Constitution.
The Manning court's statement regarding the ability of the State to outline the
procedures to be followed in takings situations allows the State significant control
over the procedures that claimants must use in order to bring takings claims.' 6° The
State could create a special statutory procedure for all takings claims and might
allow for administrative resolution of claims,' 6' as long as the parties are afforded
a significant impact on
meaningful judicial review.' 6 2 These procedures could have
63
the amount and likelihood of recovery in takings cases. 1
158. Brauneis outlines the evolution of the takings claim from its early roots as an officer suit into a direct
action for damages by the end of the nineteenth century. See Brauneis, supra note 155, at 109-15. Thus, courts have
interpreted the Takings Clause as creating a cause of action for damages for over a century.
159. See Seamon, supra note 92, at 1083-84 (describing officer suits as alternatives to inverse condemnation
suits but noting their shortcomings). Additionally, Brauneis points out that the indirect officer suit method of
enforcement, which he calls the "justification-stripping" model because it strips executive officers of the
justification to take property, was considered a "second-best" remedy that only existed because individuals were
unable to sue the State at common law. Brauneis, supra note 155, at 107. This point does not fully dispose of the
originalist argument that the Fifth Amendment was not intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity, but it does
suggest that direct suits against States are consistent with the purpose behind the Takings Clause.
160. States can control the initial procedure to be used by takings claimants. See Williamson County Reg'l
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985). If claimants attempt to bring claims in federal court
without having exhausted state takings procedures, those claims will be dismissed on ripeness grounds. Id. Thus,
for federal purposes, a taking has not even ripened until a State has failed, through its takings procedures, to
compensate the property owner. Id. This suggests that nothing prevents States from imposing their own procedures
for the initial determination of whether a taking has occurred.
Incidentally, the ripeness requirement outlined in Williamson might have the effect of totally shutting
a party out of federal court-a party may be forced by Williamson to pursue a state claim, and if the party loses on
that claim, then the party is precluded from re-litigating the claim in federal court. Berger, supranote 89, at 502-03.
This conundrum is known as the "Williamson trap." Id. at 502.
161. An administrative procedure for handling takings claims would not violate separation of powers. The
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers is protected by Article III, Section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution,
which provides: "[N]o person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to
one [branch of government], shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others...." N.M. CONST.
art. III, § 1. This provision does not prevent the resolution of legal claims through administrative proceedings as
long as adequate judicial review is afforded. See Wylie Corp. v. Mowrer, 104 N.M. 751,753, 726 P.2d 1381, 1383
(1986) (upholding the constitutionality of the workmen's compensation administration, which administratively
adjudicates claims prior to judicial review); cf. Bd. of Educ. v. Harrell, 118 N.M. 470, 483-84, 882 P.2d 511,
524-25 (1994) (finding no separation of powers violation with statutorily compelled arbitration by analogizing to
compelled administrative adjudications).
162. Harrell, 118 N.M. at 484, 882 P.2d at 525. Adequate judicial review is required by the Due Process
Clause, id. at 485, 882 P.2d at 526, and thus it is examined through the procedural due process analysis outlined
in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Harrell,118 N.M. at 486, 882 P.2d at 527. In the context of the
review of compulsory arbitration proceedings, due process requires de novo judicial review of questions of law and
substantial evidence review of findings of fact. Id. Harrell also asserts, as dictum, that the constitutional standards
governing the review of administrative determinations are the same as those governing the review of compulsory
arbitration. Id. at 485, 882 P.2d at 526.
163. In City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes ofMonterey, Ltd., Justice Souter elliptically suggested that one
procedural change-the right to a trial by jury-might affect the likelihood of recovery due to jury sympathy. 526
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One possible limit on the ability of the State to alter the procedure allowable for
takings cases is the right to a trial by jury in the New Mexico Constitution' 64 "as it
has heretofore existed"'165 at the time of ratification of the Constitution. 166 No right
to a jury trial exists in formal eminent domain proceedings,'6 7 but whether the right
exists for inverse condemnation actions arising directly under the U.S. Constitution
is an open question, both under federal 168 and state 69 law. A full exploration of the
topic is outside the scope of this Note, but if the right exists, it would constrain the
ability of the State to radically alter the procedures under which inverse
condemnation proceedings may be brought.
To conclude, the Manning court found that, because of the textual guarantee of
just compensation for all takings, 70 and because the purpose of the Takings Clause
is to check government power,' 7' claimants can sue the State for a taking even in the
absence of an enabling statute or consent on the part of the State. The court also
suggested, however, that the State has wide latitude in controlling the procedures
that takings claimants must follow.'72

U.S. 687, 743-44 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter made the suggestion in critiquing the Court's
holding allowing ajury trial in inverse condemnation proceedings brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 743.
Responding to the plurality's position that a jury trial is required in inverse condemnation proceedings in part
because plaintiffs have more elements to prove (because most eminent domain proceedings are only about damages,
but inverse condemnation proceedings often include the question of whether a taking has occurred), Souter
dismissed that point as irrelevant, except for possible jury sympathies: "Some plaintiffs' cases are easy and some
are difficult, but the difficult ones are no different in front of a jury (except on the assumption thatjuries are more
apt to give David the advantage against Goliath, which I do not believe is the plurality'spoint)." Id. at 743-44
(emphasis added). Of course, the bias of a jury (as opposed to that of a different factfinder) should not be a relevant
consideration in determining whether the Constitution requires a jury trial, but Souter's dissent indicates that this
consideration may be present.
164. N.M. CONST. art. IL§ 12.
165. Id.
166. Lisanti v. Alamo Title Ins., 2002-NMSC-032, 10, 55 P.3d 962, 965.
167. Santa Fe S. Ry. v. Baucis LLC, 1998-NMCA-002, 5, 952 P.2d 31, 32.
168. The Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the federal provision protecting the right to a trial by
jury, has not been incorporated against the States and thus the States are under no obligation to follow itin their own
courts. Bd.of Educ. v. Harrell, 118 N.M. 470, 481, 882 P.2d 511, 522 (1994) (citing Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R.
Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916)). Federal law on the topic is relevant, however, because New Mexico's
courts find federal law persuasive in interpreting New Mexico's constitutional right to trial by jury. Id. at 481, 882
P.2d at 522.
Del Monte Dunes dealt with the right to a trial by jury in an inverse condemnation proceeding brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 526 U.S. at 707-08. While the Court held that such a right did exist, only a plurality
held that it existed because the underlying action was one for inverse condemnation. Id. at715. The fifth vote,
Justice Scalia, found a right to trial by jury based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alone (without consideration of the
underlying substantive nature of the claim). Id. at 723 (Scalia, J., concurring). Importantly, two members of the
plurality, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, are no longer on the Court. Therefore, it seems safe to
conclude that the position taken by the Del Monte Dunes plurality is not the unqualified position of the Court on
the issue of whether a jury trial is required for inverse condemnation claims.
169. No New Mexico case has decided the question of whether a non-statutory inverse condemnation claim
must be put to a jury.
170. See supra notes 132-135 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 114-122 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 160-163 and accompanying text.
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3. Due Process/Tax Refund Analogy
a. The Court's Reasoning
The Manning court found, independent of the structural need for the Takings
Clause to abrogate sovereign immunity, that the Due Process Clause also required
The court raised the point, acknowledged in Alden, 74 that the
abrogation.
deprivation of a "clear and certain" remedy by a State can be a violation of due
process.' 75 In so doing, the court analogized the facts of the case at bar to Reich v.
Collins, a case where an individual successfully sued a State for a tax refund under
the Due Process Clause. 176 In Reich, the State of Georgia had a tax refund statute
that appeared to allow taxpayers to go to court and challenge illegally collected
in Alden characterized
taxes. 177 In its discussion of Reich, the U.S. Supreme Court
78
this as a remedy that had been "promised" by the State.
The Manning court likened the takings situation to the remedy that had been
"promised" in Reich. 179 The court noted that the remedy of just compensation is
found in the Constitution, and it concluded that this remedy became a "promised"
was incorporated against the States
state remedy when the Fifth Amendment
80
through the Fourteenth Amendment.1
The Manning court found that the similarity between Reich and takings cases was
"striking."' 18' Like the State in Reich, the State of New Mexico was obligated to
provide the "promised" remedy of monetary compensation "or risk violating the due
process clause."' 82 The State of New Mexico could not claim sovereign immunity
(as the State in Reich had attempted) 8 3 because doing so would deprive the
Mannings of their promised remedy and would constitute a violation of due
process. 84
b. Analysis
The court's extensive analogy to Reich v. Collins follows similar analogies used
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky 85 and
the Oregon Court of Appeals in Boise Cascade Corp. v. State ex rel. Oregon State
Board of Forestry. 86 However, the New Mexico Supreme Court went further than
those courts and used the Due Process Clause as a vehicle to pierce sovereign

173. Manning v. Mining & Minerals Div., 2006-NMSC-027, 31, 144 P.3d 87, 94.
174. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 740 (1999).
175. Manning, 2006-NMSC-027, 1 29-31, 144 P.3d at 94.
176. Id. (citing Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106 (1994)).
177. Reich, 513 U.S. at 108.
178. Alden, 527 U.S. at 740.
179. Manning, 2006-NMSC-027, 1 28, 144 P.3d at 94.
180. See id. 28, 144 P.3d at 93-94.
181. Id. 31, 144 P.3d at 94.
182. Id.
183. Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1994).
184. See Manning, 2006-NMSC-027, 1 31, 144 P.3d at 94. The Manning court noted that one commentator
had argued in favor of using the Due Process Clause to abrogate sovereign immunity in state courts for takings
claims. Id. 1 29, 144 P.3d at 94 (citing Seamon, supra note 92, at 1110-15).
185. 381 F.3d 511,528 (2004).
186. 991 P.2d 563 (1999).
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immunity. While the Sixth Circuit 87 and the Oregon Court of Appeals 88 analogized
the cases before them to the due process tax refund cases, they did not find that due
process requires that a State answer takings claims in state court. The Manning
court, unlike the Sixth Circuit and the Oregon Court of Appeals, appears to have
found a violation of the Due Process Clause. 189 In so doing, the court introduced a
different theoretical basis for its holding that sovereign immunity is inapplicable to
takings claims.
The due process theory," as applied to takings claims, relies upon an analogy to
cases involving the refund of illegally collected taxes.' In these tax refund cases,
the U.S. Supreme Court has found that States have an obligation under the Due
relief to taxpayers
Process Clause to provide meaningful pre- or post-deprivation
92
who wish to challenge the legality of their taxes.

187. In DLX, the Sixth Circuit analogized to the due process tax refund cases but did not appear to find a due
process obligation for the State to provide a remedy: "[Wlhere the Constitution requires a particular remedy, such
as through the Due Process Clause for the tax monies at issue in Reich, or through the Takings Clause as indicated
in First English, the State is required to provide that remedy in its own courts, notwithstanding sovereign
immunity." DLX, 381 F.3d at 528. In the Sixth Circuit's view, the remedy of just compensation must be provided
by a State, and that mandate applies to state courts as well as state agencies. See id.
188. Boise Cascade,991 P.2d at 567. The Oregon court's language was somewhat vague, and some language
could be interpreted as finding a due process violation:
Although Reich has little direct bearing on the issue before us, as it did not involve any issues
of sovereign immunity, the Court's description of Reich in Alden strongly suggests that States
may be required to provide promised remedies in State court proceedings by force of the Due
Process Clause alone.
Id. However, the court's actual holding rested upon the Takings Clause:
[W]e conclude that the Court, in its recent Eleventh Amendment decisions, did not intend to
abandon the notion that at least some constitutional claims are actionable against a
state.... [B]ecause of the "self-executing" nature of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, a state may be sued in state court for takings in violation
of the federal constitution.
Id. at 568-69.
189. Manning v. Mining & Minerals Div., 2006-NMSC-027, 31,144 P.3d 87, 94.
190. As discussed above, the Manning court noted that Professor Seamon, in his article The Asymmetry of
State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 92, fully articulated the theory that the Due Process Clause requires the
abrogation of sovereign immunity in takings cases brought in state court. See supra note 184. Professor Seamon's
article provides much of the basis for the theoretical underpinnings of the due process abrogation theory.
191. E.g., Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 369 (1930); Mont. Nat'l Bank of Billings v. Yellowstone County
of Mont., 276 U.S. 499, 504-05 (1928); Ward v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Love County, 253 U.S. 17, 24 (1920);
Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. v. O'Conner, 223 U.S. 280, 285 (1912). In many of these cases, taxpayers
challenged the legality of various state taxes. Once the taxes were declared illegal, the taxpayers (who had paid the
taxes under threat of penalty) were unable to obtain refunds in state court. In O'Conner,the earliest of this line of
tax cases, the U.S. Supreme Court held that taxpayers were entitled to a "clear and certain remedy," 223 U.S. at 285,
and in Ward, the Court held that the failure to refund taxes paid under compulsion was a violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ward, 253 U.S. at 24.
192. See McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Bevs. & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 51-52 (1990). While federal
taxes can be unlawful, see, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (requiring apportionment for direct taxes levied by the
federal government), tax refund cases involving state taxes often arise as a result of the Dormant Commerce Clause,
which imposes significant limits upon the abilities of States to impede interstate commerce. See Complete Auto
Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (holding that state taxation schemes, in order to comply with the
Commerce Clause, must be applied to acts with a substantial nexus to the taxing State, be fairly apportioned, not
discriminate against interstate commerce, and be fairly related to services provided by the State). Because state taxes
can easily impede interstate commerce, state taxes face a serious constitutional hurdle that federal taxes do not.
The Equal Protection Clause also protects against discriminatory taxation to some degree, and at least
one early tax refund case involved equal protection violations. See Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284
U.S. 239, 245 (1931). The modem standard for judging the constitutionality of economic regulations under the
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Pre-deprivation relief might be satisfied by the ability to challenge a tax scheme
without paying the taxes first. 93 If a State imposes a penalty on non-payment, then
a taxpayer would be entitled to post-deprivation relief, 94 which would include the
ability to obtain a refund for the taxes already paid.' 95 States are not obligated to
provide both pre- and post-deprivation relief, 96 and they are given latitude in
crafting their own remedial schemes. 97 "Clear and certain" non-judicial remedial
schemes might be acceptable as well.' 98 Importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court has not
fully explained the aspect of the problem that is most important for our purposes:
when States might be required to provide relief in their courts. The furthest the
Court has gone in terms of mandating judicial remedies is to require a State to abide
by a statute guaranteeing a judicial remedy.'99
In Reich v. Collins, the most recent U.S. Supreme Court tax refund due process
case (and the case explicitly mentioned by the Manning court), taxpayers sued the
State of Georgia after the State refused to refund illegal taxes. 200 The taxpayers had
paid the taxes in reliance upon a state statute allowing them to challenge the taxes
in court;2 °1 unfortunately for those taxpayers, once they brought their challenges, the
State refused to hear them on sovereign immunity grounds. 2 2 The Supreme Court
held that the remedy for the illegal taxation must be "clear and certain ,' 23 and, in
this instance, that remedy must be the statutorily promised reimbursement of those
taxes.2° When States deny such promised remedies, sovereign immunity is
inapplicable. 20 5
The analogy used in Manning is that a taking of property is akin to the collection
of a tax.2° If the tax is illegal, then a taxpayer should have some way of getting his
or her money back.20 7 In the case of a taking, an individual must have an opportunity
to obtain just compensation, especially since it is mandated by the Constitution.2 8
Failure2°to9 provide either constitutes a deprivation of property without due process
of law.
One of the strengths of the due process theory is that the U.S. Supreme Court
showed its approval of the theory in its decision in Alden, when the Court affirmed

Equal Protection Clause, however, is lenient rational basis review. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11 (1992)
(upholding California's property taxation scheme against an equal protection challenge, stating that the Court's
rational basis review is "especially deferential in the context of classifications made by complex tax laws.").
193. McKesson, 496 U.S. at 36-37.
194. Id. at 38-39.
195. Id.
196. See id. at 36-37.
197. Id.
198. Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 110-11 (1994).
199. Id. at 111.
200. Id. at 108-09.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 109.
203. Id. at 111.
204. Id.
205.

Id. at 109-10.

206.
207.
208.
209.

See Manning v. Mining & Minerals Div., 2006-NMSC-027,
Id.
Id.
Id.; Seamon, supra note 92, at 1102.

31, 144 P.3d 87, 94.
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the holding in Reich.2 1° One of the argument's principal weaknesses, though, is that
the Supreme Court has never applied the theory outside of the tax refund context,
and some significant differences exist between tax refunds and takings. Importantly,
Reich was about a State's promise to provide a certain remedy. 211 When the State
failed to provide the promised remedy, it violated due process. 21 2 In the takings
context, however, it is difficult to justify the notion that the States ever "promised"
anything with regard to the Takings Clause. When the Clause was ratified, it was to
be applied against the federal government.2 13 Even though the Takings Clause is
now applicable against the States by way of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is again
difficult to justify the idea that in ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment2 14the States
promised that they would provide just compensation to takings victims.
This is not to say that the tax refund cases are wholly irrelevant in the takings
context. While Reich is not completely analogous because it involved a remedy
promised by the State of Georgia, other due process tax refund cases might be more
applicable. In Ward v. Board of County Commissioners of Love County,215 for
example, there was no mention of a remedy "promised" by the State, but the Court
held that the State was required to provide the specific remedy of a refund under the
Due Process Clause.216 Preventing the taxpayer from seeking a refund would have
left the taxpayer with no method of recovering the property that the State had
illegally taken from him.21 7 This scenario seems more analogous to the takings
situation, where denying a claimant the right to seek monetary damages would
prevent the claimant from recovering for the unconstitutional deprivation of
property without just compensation. In both cases, only a monetary remedy is
appropriate to correct the constitutional violation.218
In conclusion, while the Manning court may have stretched a bit to find a direct
analogy to Reich in terms of arguing that the State "promised" the remedy of just
compensation to landowners, the due process tax refund cases still support the
abrogation of sovereign immunity, because those cases illustrate that the State is
required to provide a remedy for the deprivation of property that arises from the
failure to provide just compensation.

210. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 740 (1999).
211. See Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 111 (1994) ("But what a State may not do, and what Georgia did
here, is to reconfigure its scheme, unfairly, in mid-course-to 'bait and switch,' as some have described it.").
212. Id.
213. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 41, § 11.12, at 509. In an early takings case, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the Bill of Rights only applied against the federal government. Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243,
250-51 (1833).
214. See Berger, supra note 89, at 563 (arguing that the idea of automatic abrogation of sovereign immunity
based upon the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment is "extreme").
215. 253 U.S. 17 (1920).
216. Id. at 24.
217. See id.
218. Seamon, supra note 92, at 1111.
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A. ContractsClause Claim
Having concluded that the Mannings' takings claim was not barred by sovereign
immunity, the court then reached the opposite conclusion with respect to the
Mannings' claim under the Contracts Clause.2 19
1. Court's Reasoning
Early in the opinion, the court suggested that Alden v. Maine should not be
220
interpreted as a bar to claims against States that arise under the Constitution itself
because it is a case primarily dealing with the balance of power between Congress
and the States.2 2' While the court made these arguments when dealing with the
Takings Clause,222 the arguments were perfectly applicable to the Contracts Clause
claim because that claim also arose directly under the Constitution.
The court noted that Alden and the two New Mexico cases that have applied
Alden, Cockrell v. Board of Regents of New Mexico State University223 and Gill v.
Public Employees Retirement Board,224 dealt with the abrogation of state sovereign
immunity by Congress pursuant to its Article I powers.225 At least part of the
justification for such protection for States was a concern for federalism and the
protection of state sovereignty from the reach of Congress.226 By contrast, the court
noted that "the balance of power shifts when 'the obligation arises from the
Constitution itself.' ' 227 The court quoted further from Alden, stating that the right
of sovereign immunity can be "'altered by the plan of the Convention or certain
constitutional Amendments."' 228 When the Constitution is the source of the cause
of action,
the problem of Congress treading upon the rights of States does not
229
exist.
Although the argument that Alden only blocks claims brought pursuant to federal
statutes would logically apply to both the Takings Clause claim and the Contracts
Clause claim, the court only explicitly used the argument to support its holding in
the takings context. 2 0 Its treatment of the Contracts Clause claim was very
different.23'

219. Manning v. Mining & Minerals Div., 2006-NMSC-027, [48-50, 144 P.3d 87, 98.
220. Id. 1 26, 144 P.3d at 93.
221. Id.
222. See id.
223. 2002-NMSC-009, 1 1, 45 P.3d 876, 878.
224. 2004-NMSC-016, H 7-8, 90 P.3d 491, 495.
225. Manning, 2006-NMSC-027, 24, 113 P.3d at 92 (discussing the holdings of Cockrell and Gill).
226. Id.
227. Id. 1 27, 144 P.3d at 93 (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 740 (1999)). The use of the language
"balance of power" implies the balancing of different interests in deciding whether sovereign immunity bars a claim,
most notably an interest in maintaining the sovereignty of the States and an interest in enforcing constitutional
rights. While this is certainly a plausible way of viewing the problem, see Berger, supra note 89, at 597-600
(discussing the weighing of different constitutional values as a legitimate way of resolving the clash between
irreconcilable doctrines), the Manning court opted not to engage in an in-depth balancing of the different interests
involved.
228. Manning, 2006-NMSC-027, 1 27, 144 P.2d at 93 (quoting Alden, 527 U.S. at 713).
229. Id. 7 26-27, 144 P.3d at 93.
230. Id. 1 28, 144 P.3d at 93.
231. See id. H 48-50, 144 P.3d at 98.
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The court's Contracts Clause analysis tracked Alden's discussion of Hans v.
Louisiana.2 The cause of action in Hans was one for damages under the Contracts
234
Clause, 233 and the Hans Court found that sovereign immunity barred such claims.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Alden made it clear that Hans was still good law, and
the New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that Alden's affirmation of Hans meant
that claims for damages under the Contracts Clause were unavailable due to
sovereign immunity. 235 The Manningcourt justified the differing results between the
Takings Clause and the Contracts Clause by emphasizing the guarantee of a remedy
(just compensation) in the Takings Clause that is absent from the Contracts
Clause.236
2. Analysis
In framing Alden as a case about the proper boundaries of power between
Congress and the States, the Manning court implied that the scope of the Supreme
Court's holding in Alden did not extend to suits arising under the Constitution itself,
since those suits did not implicate federalism concerns between Congress and the
States.23 ' However, the court was only willing to apply this rationale to the Takings
Clause claim, despite its apparent applicability to the Contracts Clause claim. The
failure of the Contracts Clause claim indicates that the court did not fully accept the
argument that Alden was exclusively limited to causes of action created by
Congress. Therefore, this argument is not likely to assist future litigants in getting
around sovereign immunity.
The court's characterization of sovereign immunity doctrine as one aspect of the
Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence is certainly valid.2 38 Many of the recent
sovereign immunity cases have been about the ability of Congress to subject States
to suit without their consent.2 39 Protecting the States from Congress is one argument
in favor of sovereign immunity, 240 and to the extent that it is inapplicable when
claims arise under the Constitution itself, that is one less reason for extending
sovereign immunity.24' Alden itself distinguished Reich v. Collins,242 a due process
tax refund case, stating that the claim in that case arose under the "Constitution

232. Id. 1 49, 144 P.3d at 98. For a brief discussion of Hans in relation to current sovereign immunity
doctrine, see supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
233. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).
234. See id. at 15.
235. Manning, 2006-NMSC-027, 1 49, 144 P.3d at 98.
236. Id. 1 50, 144 P.3d at 98.
237. Id.
238. Erwin Chemerinsky, The FederalismRevolution, 31 N.M. L. REv.7,18-30 (2001) (discussing sovereign
immunity developments as part of the Rehnquist Court's "federalism revolution").
239. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress may not abrogate
a State's sovereign immunity pursuant to its commerce powers); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that
sovereign immunity protects States from congressionally created causes of action in state court); Kimel v. Fla. Bd.
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that Congress did not validly abrogate sovereign immunity with the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act); City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding no abrogation of
sovereign immunity under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
240. See Berger, supra note 89, at 567.
241. Id.
242. Alden, 527 U.S. at 740. For a fuller discussion of the implications of Alden's affirmance of Reich, see
Part IV.A.3.b.
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itself." 243 Thus, it seems fair for the Manning court to use that same distinction with
regard24to
other claims brought under the Constitution, and it did so with the takings
4
claim.

Conceptually, it makes sense to distinguish between claims brought pursuant to
acts of Congress and those brought pursuant to the Constitution itself. One of the
functions of the Constitution is to protect individual rights against encroachments
by governments." s Individual rights are nugatory, however, unless they are
enforceable-otherwise, governments have no incentive to respect them. 24 Citizens
ought to be able to bring suits in order to adequately protect themselves from
violations of their constitutional rights. 247 This deeply rooted concept is embodied
in the maxim, cited by Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison248 and attributed to

William Blackstone, 249 that for every right, there is a remedy.25 °
Furthermore, individual rights are arguably the highest constitutional value in our
constitutional system.25 1 Other values, such as protecting state sovereignty,
enforcing the separation of powers, and protecting the independence of the judiciary
are only subordinate values designed primarily to protect individual rights.25 2
Sovereign immunity simply protects the integrity and dignity of the States.2" 3 Using

243. Alden, 527 U.S. at 740.
24-27, 144 P.3d 87, 92-93.
244. Manning v. Mining & Minerals Div., 2006-NMSC-027,
245. Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) ("[Wlhen an agency refuses to act it generally does
not exercise its coercive power over an individual's liberty or property rights, and thus does not infringe upon areas
that courts often are called upon to protect"); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 167 (1803) ("The
question of whether a right has vested or not, is, in its nature, judicial, and must be tried by the judicial authority.").
246. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961).
247. Cf Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
248. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 162-63.
249. Id. at 163.
250. Id. Of course, this seemingly simple phrase does not answer the next question, which is what remedy
is provided. People do not have an unqualified right to select any remedy whenever they have suffered an injury.
Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 99, at 1787. Some remedies may not be available for some violations. Id.
251. Berger, supra note 89, at 601. For an argument about why individual rights should be valued more highly
than structural legal rules, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 204-05 (1978):
If we want our laws and our legal institutions to provide the ground rules within which [divisive]
issues will be contested then these ground rules must not be the conqueror's law.... [The law]
must state, in its greatest part, the majority's view of the common good. The institution of rights
is therefore crucial, because it represents the majority's promise to the minorities that their
dignity and equality will be respected....
The Government will not re-establish respect for law without giving the law some claim to
respect. It cannot do that if it neglects the one feature that distinguishes law from ordered
brutality. If the Government does not take rights seriously, then it does not take law seriously
either.
Thus, Dworkin argues that rights must be respected because they are the only way for minorities within a political
system to accept as legitimate the decisions of the majority; hence they are the only way to ensure that all members
of society respect the rule of law.
252. As Justice O'Connor explained in New York v. United States:
The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state
governments as abstract political entities, or even for the benefit of the public officials governing
the States. To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and state
governments for the protection of individuals. State sovereignty is not just an end in itself:
Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign
power.
505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting));
see also Berger, supranote 89, at 549.
253. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714-15 (1999).
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sovereign immunity to block the enforcement of individual constitutional rights
would mean promoting a subordinate value, federalism, at the expense of a more
fundamental value, the protection of individual rights.254
Finally, in the context of suits based upon the Constitution, arguments about
protecting the public fisc fail to fully persuade. 55 States must already answer suits
for injunctive relief under the Ex Parte Young doctrine, and such suits can be more
costly than suits for monetary damages. 256 Even if public finances are threatened by
suits based upon the Constitution, then at least the cost of unconstitutional
state
25 7
action is borne by the State as a whole, as opposed to private victims.

However, as the Manning court recognized with regard to the Contracts Clause
claim, Alden was not exclusively about the reach of Congress, and it did not exactly
signal that the courthouse doors should be thrown open to all claims based upon the
Constitution itself. Alden reaffirmed the holding258 and reasoning25 9 of Hans v.
Louisiana, which barred a claim brought pursuant to the Contracts Clause.2 °
Furthermore, much of Alden's historical reasoning regarding the intent of the
framers on the issue of sovereign immunity had little or nothing to do with
Congress.2 6'
The result in Manning, given Alden's unequivocal approval of Hans, is likely a
faithful interpretation of how the U.S. Supreme Court would decide the issue. Hans
was not, however, strictly controlling precedent (because it dealt with a case in
federal court, not state court) and Alden left the door open to some constitutional
claims overcoming sovereign immunity through its approval of Reich and its lack
of an ironclad rule on the abrogative effect of all federal substantive law.262

254. Berger, supra note 89, at 601.
255. Id. at 548; William P. Marshall & Jason S. Cowart, State Immunity, PoliticalAccountability,and Alden
v. Maine, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1069, 1082-83 (2000).
256. Berger, supranote 89, at 548.
257. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960) ("The Fifth Amendment.. was designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole.").
258. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 732 (arguing that federal law cannot automatically abrogate sovereign immunity
in every instance due to Hans); id. at 754 (stating that Hans is precedent for the proposition that suits against
nonconsenting States are not properly heard in the courts).
259. See id. at 716, 720, 723-25 (adopting Hans' interpretation of the original understanding of sovereign
immunity and the Eleventh Amendment); id. at 727 (citing Hans for the argument that the Constitution should not
be construed in such a way as to lead to an anomalous result); id. at 729 (citing Hans for the argument that the
Eleventh Amendment merely confirms a presupposition about state sovereign immunity); id. at 746 (noting that
Hans assumed the applicability of sovereign immunity in state court when it found a sovereign immunity bar in
federal court).
260. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).
261. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 715-16 (asserting that state sovereign immunity was established at the time of
the ratification of the Constitution); id. at 716-19 (surveying the debates surrounding ratification and concluding
that the original understanding was that States could not be sued under Article III without their consent); id. at
720-27 (explaining the reaction to Chisholm v. Georgia and the swift passage of the Eleventh Amendment as
evidence that the majority of the Founders believed that the sovereign immunity of the States was intact); id. at
741-43 (arguing that the silence of the Founders on the topic of sovereign immunity in state courts is evidence that
they never contemplated that such immunity was in doubt).
262. See id. at 732 ("We reject any contention that substantive federal law by its own force necessarily
overrides the sovereign immunity of the States.") (emphasis added). The use of the word "necessarily" might imply
that some substantive federal law might override sovereign immunity of its own force. See Berger, supranote 89,
at 535 (stating that the word "necessarily" gives the Court some "wiggle room" to carve out exceptions to the
general rule).
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The Manning court could have ruled that all claims based upon the Constitution,
including Contracts Clause claims, may proceed in state court, unimpeded by
sovereign immunity. In the end, however, the court chose to abide by a reading of
Hans that precludes such a holding.263 The one aspect of this choice that the court
failed to fully acknowledge is that it should not have attempted to limit Alden with
regard to the takings issue. If Hans is still good law, then its reasoning should carry
over to other claims brought under the Constitution, including takings claims. While
there are other, independent reasons why the Takings Clause should abrogate
sovereign immunity,26 the 26limited
scope of Alden should not have been used as an
5
argument for such a

result.

Of course, individuals who have suffered from a Contracts Clause violation could
still seek non-monetary relief through one of the well-established routes around
sovereign immunity, such as prospective injunctive relief by way of the Ex Parte
Young doctrine.
Indeed, many Contracts Clause claims proceed in just such a
266
manner.

V. IMPLICATIONS
The holding of the New Mexico Supreme Court in Manning provides some
guidance for future litigants seeking monetary damages against the State for
constitutional violations. Obviously, claimants will be able to seek monetary
damages for Takings Clause claims,2 67 and not for Contracts Clause claims.26 8
Because of the reasoning used to arrive at these results, it may prove difficult for
claimants to seek monetary damages for violations of other constitutional
provisions.
The most significant hurdle that Manning places before future claimants is that
it applies Alden-type sovereign immunity to a claim based upon the Constitution
itself-namely, the Contracts Clause.269 This establishes that the scope of Alden, at
least in New Mexico, is not limited to causes of action created by Congress pursuant
to its Article I powers. 270 Any future litigants seeking monetary damages for claims
brought directly under the Constitution will have to find a way around Alden.
Furthermore, the twin rationales in Manning supporting the result that takings
suits are not barred by sovereign immunity-abrogation based upon the unique

263. See Manning v. Mining & Minerals Div., 2006-NMSC-027, 7 49-50, 144 P.3d 87, 98.
264. See Part W.A.
265. The court's explanation for the different results was that the Takings Clause contained a remedy for
monetary damages, whereas the Contracts Clause contained no such remedy. Manning, 2006-NMSC-027, 1 50, 144
P.3d at 98. While it is impossible to quibble with such a distinction, the textual differences between the two clauses
do not make Alden more applicable to one rather than the other. Instead, the court might have explained that Alden
has something to say about all claims brought under the Constitution, but that the textual guarantee of just
compensation allowed the Takings Clause to surmount Alden's sovereign immunity hurdle.
266. See, e.g., supra note 66 (listing U.S. Supreme Court Contracts Clause cases where plaintiff sought
injunctive relief).
267. See supra Part [V.A.
268. See supra Part IVB.
269. See supra Part IV.B.
270. See supra Part IV.B.
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2 72
nature of the Takings Clause 2 7' and abrogation based upon the Due Process Clause
-are unlikely to transfer easily to other claims brought under the Constitution.
The Manning court found that the Takings Clause has unique attributes2 73 that
require the abrogation of sovereign immunity and also dismissed the Contracts
Clause claim partly on the grounds that it lacks the textual guarantee of a remedy.274
This reasoning will be difficult to employ in the context of other constitutional
claims. Because no other constitutional rights besides the Habeas Corpus Clause
have an explicit remedy, 75 claimants will be unable to analogize to that aspect of the
Takings Clause. They may be able to argue that other constitutional rights have a
similar purpose as the Takings Clause (i.e., the need to check abusive government
power),276 but to complete the analogy they might still need to show that the
recovery of monetary damages is necessary to effectuate that purpose. 7
By not only basing its takings holding upon the unique character of the Fifth
Amendment, but also finding a violation of due process, the court may have kept the
door open for other plaintiffs to bring constitutional claims based upon a "promised
remedy" of compensation. However, those plaintiffs will face the significant hurdle
of proving that a remedy for a constitutional violation has been promised by the
State of New Mexico, or that monetary relief is the only sufficient remedy for the
injury. It is difficult to envision where such cases might arise outside of the takings
or tax refund context. Therefore, this alternate route around sovereign immunity will
likely be of little assistance to future plaintiffs.278
The court's holding in Manning has also given the State the opportunity to dictate
the procedures to be followed in order to recover for takings.279 Whether the State
accepts the court's offer remains to be seen, but such procedures might have a
significant impact on the ability of takings claimants to bring their cases, especially
if the constitutional right to a trial by jury does not exist in inverse condemnation
cases (which is an open question).2 8 ° In the final analysis, however, the likelihood
of such a drastic change to how the State handles takings is probably slim. First, the
eminent domain statutes already allow for a trial by jury. 28 ' Second, the right to a
trial by jury has expanded in recent decades to allow for juries to hear more issues

271. See supraPart 1V.A.2.
272. See supraPart IV.A.3.
273. See supraPart IV.A.2.
274. See supranote 236 and accompanying text.
275. See supranote 133.
276. See supranote 129 and accompanying text.
277. See supranotes 115-122 and accompanying text.
278. One possible scenario might be in the context of contracts with the State. When parties contract with the
State, especially for money, they are essentially being "promised" something akin to the promised remedy from
Reich. See supra notes 200-205 and accompanying text. However, the State has already waived sovereign immunity
for actions based upon written contracts. NMSA 1978, § 37-1-23 (1976) (waiving sovereign immunity for contract
actions against the State based upon written contracts only). A due process argument could be made that the State
should have to answer for promises made in oral contracts as well. The counterargument to this position is that the
Due Process Clause should not be used to constitutionalize every contract action involving the State.
279. See supra notes 160-163 and accompanying text.
280. See supranotes 168-169.
281. NMSA 1978, § 42A-1-21(A) (1981); Santa Fe s. Ry. v. Baucis LLC, 1998-NMCA-002, 15,952 P.2d

31, 32.
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in eminent domain cases.2" 2 Thus, even though the State may have the power to alter
the procedure
used in takings cases, there may not be any political willpower to do
83
2

SO.

Finally, the court's treatment of the Contracts Clause claim also answers a
question about the scope of Alden in New Mexico. While language elsewhere in the
opinion suggests that Alden is limited to the specific question of whether Congress
can use its Article I powers to abrogate sovereign immunity, the Manning court's
holding that Alden bars a state court Contracts Clause claim makes Alden a far more
potent precedent, presumptively barring all claims against the State, constitutional
or otherwise, unless they fall within an express exception to sovereign immunity.
Although this holding is likely a faithful interpretation of Alden, it essentially
forecloses future arguments by parties attempting to limit the scope of Alden to
claims created under Congress's Article I powers.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Manning, the New Mexico Supreme Court was faced with whether state
sovereign immunity, as explained in Alden v. Maine, covered claims brought under
the Takings Clause and the Contracts Clause. In holding that Alden blocked the
Contracts Clause claim, the court expanded the scope of Alden to include claims
brought under the Constitution itself. Additionally, because the court found that the
Takings Clause abrogates sovereign immunity based upon its unique attributes,
particularly the existence of a textually guaranteed remedy, future litigants will face
challenges in surmounting sovereign immunity with constitutionally based claims
for monetary damages. The court did provide an independent rationale for an
abrogation of sovereign immunity based upon the Due Process Clause, but the
theory employed by the court has heretofore only been employed in tax refund cases
and is unlikely to have wide application. In dicta, Manning also suggests that the
State has broad discretion when structuring the procedures employed in bringing
takings claims, although drastic changes to takings procedures may be politically
unlikely in the near future.

282. Santa Fe S. Ry., 1998-NMCA-002, W18-10, 952 P.2d at 33-34 (holding that a 1981 statute expanded
the role of the jury in eminent domain situations to decide all issues, whereas the prior statute only permitted the
jury to decide compensation).
283. After the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), there was
a fear that the opinion invited governments to condemn low-cost property only to transfer it to other private
individuals who would pay more taxes. E.g., Kelo, id. at 501 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In response to the Kelo
decision, the New Mexico State Legislature has passed legislation restricting the ability of local governments to
condemn property for economic development purposes. H.B. 393, 48th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2007).

